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Scientific Realism meets




I examine the epistemological debate on scientific realism in the
context of quantum physics, focusing on the empirical underdetermin-
ation of different formulations and interpretations of QM. I will argue
that much of the interpretational, metaphysical work on QM tran-
scends the kinds of realist commitments that are well-motivated in the
light of the history of science. I sketch a way of demarcating empirically
well-confirmed aspects of QM from speculative quantum metaphysics
in a way that coheres with anti-realist evidence from the history of
science. The minimal realist attitude sketched withholds realist com-
mitment to what quantum state |Ψ〉 represents. I argue that such
commitment is not required for fulfilling the ultimate realist motiva-
tion: accounting for the empirical success of quantum mechanics in a
way that is in tune with a broader understanding of how theoretical
science progresses and latches onto reality.
1 Introduction
The epistemological debate on scientific (anti-)realism has hitherto made
little contact with philosophy of quantum physics. The latter mostly revolves
around metaphysical controversies, recent developments of which raise a
serious epistemic demarcation problem for the scientific realist: the realist
needs to outline a principled way to distinguish empirically well-confirmed
aspects of quantum physics from the quantum metaphysics that is a hotbed
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of controversy, disagreement, and (seemingly) radical speculation. Here I
explore the nature of this demarcation problem and propose a way for the
realist to approach it.
The scientific realism debate in general philosophy of science has a core
epistemological dimension. According to realists we are justified in optim-
ism regarding sciences’ ability to represent the reality beyond observable
phenomena. There is much variation in how optimistic we should be in this
regard, but all realists are optimistic compared to anti-realists—empiricists
and instrumentalists—who mainly place their trust in the sciences’ deliv-
erances regarding observable matters. The principal motivation for realism
comes from the empirical success of science. What primarily drives the real-
ists, in connection with theoretical sciences in particular, is the impressive
predictive and explanatory success of our best theories. Arguably realism
best accounts for this success, while antirealists’ complete lack of optim-
ism about theoretical progress and the reach of theory-based knowledge fits
badly with the systematic success of science in yielding impressive predic-
tions and seemingly good explanations.
Given the realists’ emphasis on empirical success, one should expect this
epistemological debate to rage in connection with quantum physics. For, on
the one hand, quantum physics is one of the most successful areas of science
of all time, and as such it elicits the realist intuition from empirical success as
forcefully as anything in modern science: if there is anything we should want
to be realists about, it is quantum physics.1 On the other hand, there are
well-known challenges in pinning down what quantum physics purportedly
says about the unobservable reality, making it exceptionally challenging to
say what realism ‘about the quantum’ actually amounts to. In the light
of this obvious tension, one would indeed expect quantum physics to be
the battle ground for scientific realism. Digging into the large literature on
scientific realism reveals very limited discussion focused on QM, however.2
While surprisingly little has been said about the implications of QM to
the core epistemic issues in the realism debate, a huge deal has been written
1The realist intuition about QM is driven by countless novel predictions and explan-
atory achievements with respect to various distinct phenomena regarding atomic spectra,
the periodic structure of elements, the band structure of the semiconductors, to name a
few.
2There are some notable exceptions, of course, such as Cordero (2001), Cushing (1994),
Barrett (2003), Belousek (2005), van Fraassen (1991).
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about the metaphysical implications of quantum physics, both in relation
to quantum field theory and non-relativistic quantum mechanics. From the
early days of quantum physics there has been extensive investigation into
metaphysical issues that naturally arise from a realist outlook: what could
the world literally described by quantum theories be like? Although this
metaphysical question is naturally associated realism, it should not be iden-
tified with the essentially epistemological issues at the heart of the realism
debate as they have been discussed in general philosophy of science. The lat-
ter issues—the topic of this paper—largely concerns the level of optimism we
are justified in having towards quantum physics: In what sense (if any) are
we justified in regarding QM as partially or approximately true, or (more
generally) as latching onto unobservable reality? What kind of epistemic
optimism about QM best coheres with the historicist anti-realist evidence
regarding the pessimistic track-record of science in figuring out, through
empirically highly successful theories, the fundamental nature of light, heat,
gravity, and so on? What kind of epistemic optimism best coheres with the
kind of underdetermination exhibited by the different variants of QM, or
the likelihood of there being yet further variants hitherto unconceived by
theorists?
The last of these questions has began to look particularly pressing of
late, as metaphysical explorations of QM have taken an increasingly radical
turn. A casual survey of the blooming metaphysical literature on QM raises
pressing questions about the epistemological status of the competing claims
regarding the nature of quantum state involved in various competing ac-
counts. This is made all the more pressing by the striking lack of consensus
amongst the experts: the current state of the art exhibits an unpreceden-
ted and radical underdetermination of the different world-views associated
with a scientific theory that enjoys extraordinarily solid and varied empirical
evidence.3 Consequently many philosophers are alarmed by this underde-
termination, because it appears to make it extraordinarily difficult to say
what realism about QM amounts to.
A detailed examination of this interaction between the epistemology and
the metaphysics of QM is long overdue. Here I will contribute to this task
by delineating an epistemic attitude towards QM that coheres well not only
3This lack of consensus is equally true amongst philosophers of physics and physicists
themselves. For one snapshot, see Schlosshauer et al. (2013).
3
with the current state of affairs regarding quantum metaphysics, but also
with (what I regard as) the most promising realist response to the anti-realist
arguments from the history of science. I will outline a sense in which a realist
can regard QM as more than a mere instrument for prediction, allowing for
quantum theoretic understanding of various empirical phenomena. I will
sketch a realist account of the empirical success of QM that demarcates
empirically confirmed aspects of QM from quantum metaphysics, withholds
commitment to what quantum state |Ψ〉 represents in the world, and avoids
the brunt of the underdetermination problem.
2 The epistemic demarcation problem
Most scientific realists are naturally wary of the deeper reaches of meta-
physics when it comes to delineating their epistemic commitments. While
realists do not want to renounce metaphysics altogether in the way e.g. con-
structive empiricists do—think of van Fraassen (1980), for example—they
generally acknowledge the pressure of the anti-realist arguments from either
the history of science, or underdetermination, or both. Realists have toiled
hard to render their epistemic commitments compatible with the features of
past and present science emphasised by the anti-realists. In the light of these
features it would be an obvious folly for the realist to commit to anything
like the literal truth of any piece of current physics. More generally, real-
ists should want to be less committal towards the more deeply metaphysical
claims about the nature of reality, given the evidence of the unreliability
of theoretical reasoning regarding such claims (e.g. Laudan 1981, Stanford
2006). For this reason prominent realist positions tend to radically reduce
their epistemic commitments from a face-value reading of theoretical science,
and only bank on what our theories say, for example, about the ‘structure’
of reality, or about the core causal features of the unobservable world (as
opposed to peripheral metaphysical embellishments that scientists may ap-
peal to for the sake of intelligibility). (I will examine these in further detail
in Section 3.)
Recent philosophy of QM stands in stark contrast to this broadly anti-
metaphysical trend in the epistemology of scientific realism. Over the past
couple of decades much of the philosophical work inspired by QM has gained
an increasingly deep metaphysical flavour. Various radical ideas about the
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fundamental nature of reality have emerged as philosophers have attempted
to spell out what the world described by the different variants of QM could
be like if the theory is taken to truly represent the unobservable world behind
the appearances. Many of these ideas are, prima facie, not only radical, but
also rather indirectly connected to the actual scientific practice of using
quantum theory to predict, manipulate, and explain things. For this reason
I call them ‘deeply’ metaphysical.
Consider, for example, the debate about wavefunction realism. This
debate about the nature of |Ψ〉 construed as a field-like feature of the world—
as a literal reading of QM might suggest—was sparked by the recognition
that the central posit of quantum mechanics, the wavefunction |Ψ〉, can be
naturally interpreted as representing a field, but only if one takes seriously a
very high-dimensional ‘configuration’ space, quite different from the familiar
3-space (or 3+1 spacetime) that we are directly acquainted with (Ney and
Albert 2013). This line of thought immediately calls for a deep metaphysical
account of quantum reality, since any interpretation of QM involving a realist
commitment to |Ψ〉 thus construed cries out for a story of how the familiar 3-
space (whether as a real-but-not-fundamental space, or merely as a matter
of appearances) ‘emergences’ from, or relates to, the very different space
occupied by the wavefunction (see essays in Ney and Albert 2013).
Wavefunction realism is partly motivated by a fairly literal realist reading
of the theory’s formalism, but it is by no means forced upon the realist. A
much discussed alternative is to demote the wavefunction to a different onto-
logical category altogether, construing it rather as representing dynamical-
cum-nomological features of a primitive ontology that occupies the familiar
3-dimensional space. Relegating the ontological status of |Ψ〉 to a law-like
feature of reality avoids the need to tell a deep metaphysical story of how
what we see around us relates to (or emerges from) it, but instead it re-
quires commitment to some kind of ‘primitive stuff’ (Maudlin 2007, Allori
2013). As to the nature of such ‘stuff’ occupying spacetime, a broad array of
alternatives have been entertained by its advocates, ranging from relatively
sparse momentary flashes in spacetime, to an esoteric mass density field, to
individual particles that are entirely featureless in terms of their intrinsic
properties, and so on. (For a brief review see e.g. Esfeld 2014.) There is a
clear sense in which such primitive ontology is deeply metaphysical in that
it is, indeed, posited as an ontological primitive, as opposed to being some-
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thing that needs to be written into the theory in the interest of improved
predictions or explanations of empirical phenomena. Furthermore, regard-
ing the wavefunction as a purely dynamical-cum-nomological feature of the
world is itself an interpretational move that is far from obvious from the
perspective of scientific practice. Such a move can be motivated in various
ways philosophically, of course, but these largely hinge on deep metaphysical
issues around laws of nature.4
There is no shortage of exciting alternatives in the quantum metaphys-
ical marketplace: a further option is to regard the wavefunction merely
as a representation of quantum superpositions, and to take the notion of
quantum superposition itself at face-value, as a primitive and fundamental
feature of reality. This is what the (in)famous Everettian many-worlds inter-
pretation does. This line of thought is frequently defended by its advocates
as being metaphysically light weight, introducing no further metaphysical
posits or assumptions than what is to be found already in quantum physics
(both in QFT and QM) pure and simple (Saunders et al. 2010, Wallace
2012, Vaidman 2014). To an extent this seems right: there is no need to
posit a primitive ontology, or to adopt a particular stance regarding the
metaphysics of laws of nature, for instance. On the other hand, the meta-
physical picture of reality painted by the many-worlds interpretation relies
on making sense of how effectively stable classical branches (or ‘worlds’)
‘emerge’ from the quantum multiverse. The Everettian understanding of
‘classical worlds’ as quasi-independent, stable patterns of an unimaginably
richly structured fundamental quantum state of the universe relies not only
on important features of quantum theory itself—environment-induced deco-
herence, in particular—but also on a deeply metaphysical account of how
we can relate our (mostly ‘classical’) experiences to the quantum formalism
that can describe the fundamental quantum multiverse.
This broad-brush run-through of the metaphysical aspects of the most
central theoretical posit of QM, the wavefunction, in the most prominent
realist interpretations of QM highlights a couple of things relevant to sci-
entific realism. Firstly, as I will discuss further below, interpretations of
QM, when spelt out in the level of detail required for their defence, become
deeply metaphysical due to indispensably involving ideas about quantum
4See, e.g., Esfeld et al. (2015), Esfeld (2016), and Bhogal and Berry (2015), for discus-
sions about Humean metaphysics as a backdrop to Bohmian QM.
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reality, and its relationship to observable features of the world, that are
far removed from the actual scientific use of quantum theory to predict
and explain empirical phenomena. Secondly, assuming that the different
interpretations are underwritten by variants of QM that are all sufficiently
empirically adequate, the realist faces a radical underdetermination of the
metaphysical alternatives.
A natural knee-jerk realist response to the deeply metaphysical claims
associated with QM is an incredulous stare. Should we seriously regard
ourselves as having discovered, by carefully reflecting on an empirically ex-
tremely well confirmed scientific theory, that tables and chairs are stable,
effectively non-interacting parts of an incredibly complex quantum multi-
verse? Or that they are in some sense reducible to a fundamental wavefunc-
tion that ‘lives’ in an extremely high-dimensional configuration space? Or
that material objects are galaxies of relatively rare flashes associated with a
sui generis dynamical collapse law that doesn’t give rise to any new predic-
tions? Such claims are all well and good as part of a metaphysical endeavour
and as exploratory science, and for all we know one of them might depict
the world more or less correctly. But in the light of the well-motivated anti-
metaphysical trend in the epistemology of scientific realism, a realist should
be very wary of regarding any such claim as an empirically well-confirmed
part of current science, falling under the realist’s epistemic commitments.
A realist operating with appropriate epistemic caution should rather re-
gard such claims as belonging to some different, more speculative epistemic
plane; claiming them to be part of scientific realist commitments is naturally
greeted with an incredulous stare.5
Such incredulous stare is partly an indication of the high epistemic stakes
of the radical revisions that interpretations of QM call for with respect to
our everyday image of reality. We have, of course, become quite accustomed
to the idea that the features of fundamental reality revealed to us by modern
physics are unfathomably unlike our ‘everyday reality’. But it is still reason-
able to require that the evidence in support of any proposed metaphysical
image of empirical reality should be commensurate with how revisionary
that image is. The realists’ worry about deeply metaphysical stories about
quantum reality is that they are just that: just-so stories, devised so as to
5Note that none of this speaks against the rationality, meaningfulness, purposefulness,
etc. of this kind of metaphysics. The point is purely epistemological.
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make sense of quantum mechanics literally construed, but without all the
qualities that render scientific theories well confirmed by empirical evidence.
This worry is bolstered by the fact that there is serious competition for any
particular metaphysical image of quantum reality, making it harder to jus-
tify the adoption of any of the specific alternatives as being firmly a part of
the scientific realist’s commitments.6
Assuming the realist is rightly worried about any particular interpreta-
tion of QM, what epistemic attitude should she have towards it then? Should
she give up realism about QM altogether in the light of the historical track
record of theorists’ unreliability in pinning down the metaphysics of empir-
ically successful theories? This would, of course, give the realist game away
entirely in connection with one of the empirically most successful areas of
science, making it thereby also harder to maintain the realist motivation
(which, recall, just turns on empirical success of science) in relation to other
areas of science that deal with fundamental features of reality. Or can the
realist appeal to some notion of ‘approximate truth’ or ‘selective’ realism
that does not take QM at anything like its face value, but nevertheless
maintains that the theory ‘latches onto’ reality in ways that account for
its empirical success? There is significant pressure for the realist to find a
way of doing this, but it is not easy, as it requires a principled criterion to
demarcate justified epistemic commitments from what the realist should be
inclined to view as ‘metaphysical hubris’, as far as the empirical evidence
for the theory is concerned. Delineating such a criterion is thus the prime
task for scientific realists in relation to QM.
In attesting to some such demarcation criterion scientific realists res-
ist the kind of confirmational holism that naturalistic metaphysicians often
appeal to. It has been argued—in the spirit of Quinean naturalistic ‘indis-
pensability argument’, for example—that as realists we ought to commit to
whatever theoretical assumptions indispensably contribute to our best sci-
entific theories being the best: most predictive, explanatory, unifying, and
simplest, etc. According to this line of thought, even if there is a distinction
to be drawn between ‘traditional’ metaphysics and ‘scientific metaphysics’,
when it comes to the latter it’s a package deal (see Saatsi 2017 for a critical
6Peter Lewis (2016: 182) aptly summarises the state of play at the end of his book
length review of quantum metaphysics: “Very little can be concluded unconditionally on
the basis of quantum mechanics . . . The best we can say is that not everything in our
received classical worldview can be right.”
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discussion). Even if relying on such confirmational holism is a way of do-
ing metaphysics and justifying it as a rational endeavour, scientific realists
should maintain that there is a more fine-grained demarcation to be done in
relation to the epistemic reach of empirical evidence. The need for such a
demarcation can be further motivated by considering, by way of an analogy,
sensible realist attitudes towards metaphysics of other scientific theories,
e.g. classical mechanics or biology. Various philosophers, in the spirit of
naturalistic metaphysics, have drawn deeply metaphysical conclusions from
classical mechanics, for instance. According to Quinean naturalists, scientific
realists should say that numbers exist, given their indispensable theoretical
and explanatory role in e.g. classical mechanics (e.g. Colyvan 2015; see Saatsi
2017 for criticism). According to Lewisian genuine modal realists, the modal
features of classical physics can support very substantive theses in modal
metaphysics (Lewis 1986; see also Williamson 2016). According to others,
classical physics provides evidence for the reality of dispositions (e.g. Bi-
gelow, Parketter 1990). According to the Humeans, the laws of classical
physics are best-system regularities (e.g. Cohen and Callender 2009). Given
that classical mechanics is a hugely successful theoretical framework empir-
ically, a scientific realist attitude towards it is very well motivated. But does
the empirical success of classical mechanics suggest that we should extend
scientific realist commitments to the kinds of things that metaphysicians
naturally associate with this theory’s ontology: e.g. numbers, dispositions,
particular metaphysics of laws? Friends of confirmational holism may think
so (see e.g. Ellis 2009), but most philosophers engaged in the scientific real-
ism debate rightly worry that there is a slide to speculative metaphysics here:
notwithstanding their ‘naturalistic’, science-driven credentials, metaphysical
claims about abstracta, the ontology of laws of nature, and modality, for ex-
ample, transcend the empirical evidence in a way that outstrips the kind of
empirical justification that realists rely on.
Resisting confirmational holism in this way requires more than a mere
assertion, of course. I have said more to this effect elsewhere, e.g. with re-
spect to mathematical platonism and scientific realism (Saatsi 2007, 2017).
Here I just want to stress that many scientific realists do not want to slide
into committing themselves to the various posits and explanations that the
best metaphysical analyses may associate with that theory. In a similar vein,
many scientific realists about biological theories of the evolution of proteins,
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say, or speciation processes, do not want to be saddled with having to pick
a metaphysical account of species, or, proteins as natural kinds. This is
largely due to the fact these metaphysical analyses are simply too indirectly
connected to the empirical successes of the relevant theories that motivate
realism in the first place. I think we should follow this intuition regarding
quantum metaphysics as well: the realist should not feel pressed to choose
between the competing metaphysical packages, because those metaphysical
accounts are too indirectly connected to the empirical successes that mo-
tivate realism about QM in the first place. I will base my realist analysis
on this intuition after critically reviewing, in the next section, some realist
‘recipes’ that one might try to appropriate to QM.
3 Realist ‘recipes’ to the rescue?
In response to the anti-realist challenges scientific realists have come up with
various ways of demarcating the belief-worthy contents of science from what
seems, in the light of the history of science in particular, rather more spec-
ulative and less trust-worthy. These demarcation principles are typically
given in the abstract, recipe-like, so as to be applicable to different scientific
theories, more or less independently of their specific subject matter or con-
tent. Familiar monikers include ‘structural realism’, ‘entity realism’, and
‘semi-realism’, each of which stands for a particular recipe for extracting
from a given scientific theory its belief-worthy content, so as to allow the
realist to be agnostic in a principled way about the rest of the theory, which
can function as a mere heuristic crutch, or as a vehicle for a pleasing (but
not necessarily truth-tracking) sense of intelligibility. One might think that
the right way to approach the demarcation problem in the context of QM is
also a matter of first identifying and then applying the right realist recipe.
I seriously doubt this is the best way for the realist to proceed, partly
due to my general misgivings about the spirit of (what I have called) recipe-
realism (Saatsi 2015). Instead of aiming to provide an abstract recipe for
extracting realist commitments from any given theory, it is better, I believe,
to attend to the nature and subject matter of the theory in question, and
ask how that theory’s empirical successes are best accounted for in a realist
spirit. There is no reason whatsoever to expect the answer to not vary
from one theory (or area of science) to another in substantial ways that are
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not well captured by any abstract recipe (without such a recipe becoming
rather contentless and disjunctive, at least). Rather, we should be open to
the possibility that science itself, as well as realist commitments towards it,
varies in such a way that the realist is better off by providing various more
local exemplars of the sense in which the realist wants to commit herself to a
given theory latching onto unobservable reality, without reducing that sense
to any general characterisation of ‘partial’ or ‘approximate’ truth, or truth
‘about structure’ or ‘detection properties’ (Saatsi 2016). Let’s now briefly
consider some prominent realist recipes in relation to QM more specifically.
Structural realism, as first proposed by John Worrall (1989) in con-
nection with Fresnel’s ether theory of light, relies on a distinction between
a theory’s structural content (or what it says about the structure of the
world), on the one hand, and its non-structural content (or what it says
about the nature of the world), on the other hand. Structural realism aims
to capitalise on structural commonalities between different theories in order
to provide a sense in which false theories—theories we struggle to view as
‘approximately true’ at the level of ontology—can nevertheless be taken to
latch onto unobservable reality. Its advocates have suggested that structural
commonalities between classical physics and quantum mechanics also fit this
image, even if not as neatly as Worrall’s main example does.7 Ladyman and
Ross (2007, p. 94), for example, argue for this by offering some simple ex-
amples of “continuity in the mathematical structure of successive scientific
theories”, even across “the most radical cases of theory change in science,
namely the transition from classical mechanics to Special Relativity, and the
transition from classical mechanics to quantum mechanics.”
The transition from classical mechanics to theories of relativity is a rich
area of study, which has been discussed in the realism context in detail by
Barrett (2008) and Saatsi (2016). The subtle correspondence between New-
tonian gravity and Einstein’s general theory of relativity is where the action
is, given that the general theory is more fundamental than the special the-
ory, and given the particularly stark ontological disparity between GTR and
Newtonian gravity. Spelling out how the latter ‘approximates’ the structure
of general theory of relativity arguably requires ideological resources specific
to this area of physics, and properly accounting for the empirical success
7I do not endorse the structuralist reading of the Fresnel-Maxwell theory-shift either
(Saatsi 2005).
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of the classical theory, with its radically mistaken face-value ontology of
gravitational forces acting at-a-distance, involves much beyond the notion
that there is ‘partial continuity of mathematical structure’ between the two
theories (see also Weatherall 2011). A realist’s account of what makes New-
tonian gravity empirically successful can ultimately have little in common
with her account of what makes Fresnel’s ether theory empirically success-
ful. In particular, I (for one) do not see any useful abstract characterisation
of structure that furnishes a unified explanatory sense in which Newtonian
gravity and Fresnel’s ether theories can both be regarded as ‘getting the
structure right’.
How about QM then? Here the structural realists point to various well-
known results that capture one or another aspect of the quantum-classical
correspondence. For example, Ladyman and Ross (2007) mention Ehren-
fest’s theorems, and Bohr’s ‘correspondence principle’ which requires that
quantum mechanical models ought to mathematically reduce to their clas-
sical equivalents in the limit of large numbers of particles or when Planck’s
constant is taken to zero.8 French (2014) additionally points to the two the-
ories’ symmetry features, such as the relationship between Poisson brackets
(classical) and Moyal brackets (quantum), which is naturally captured in
group-theoretic terms. All these important relationships between the clas-
sical and the quantum—and there’s plenty more, cf. Landsman (2007)—no
doubt have a role to play in our best scientific understanding of the quantum-
classical correspondence, as well as in a realist account of her epistemic com-
mitments towards QM. But the account itself is again not reducible to the
existence of such ‘structural’ correspondences. Rather, the account crucially
involves sui generis dynamical features of QM, falling under the heading of
decoherence, in particular, as I will discuss below (§4). Again, as we will
see, the ideological resources required for a realist account of how classical
physics relates to quantum physics are specific to quantum dynamics, and
they involve much beyond the notion that there is a partial continuity of
8Ehrenfest’s theorem shows how quantum mechanical expectation values of momentum
and position operators obey an equation that structurally corresponds to Newton’s equa-
tions of motion.
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mathematical structures between the two theories.9
Let’s now move to the other side of the realist spectrum, as it were, where
Hacking (1982, 1983) and Cartwright (1983), amongst others, have defended
a very different kind of realist recipe for delineating realist commitments.
The central idea of entity realism is that realists should be committed to
those (and only those) aspects of electrons, for example, that are required
to account for scientists’ ability to build finely-tuned ‘electron spraying’
instruments, such as the electron ‘guns’ that produce beams of polarised
electrons, widely used in atomic and condensed matter physics. As Hacking’s
famous slogan has it, “if you can spray them, they are real.” (1983: 23)
Electrons are of course exactly the kind of thing that QM is used to study
and understand, but Hacking regards such high-level quantum theoretical
grasp of electrons entirely unnecessary for realism. Allegedly one simply
need not appeal to a high-level theory to successfully build and operate an
electron gun; all that is needed is knowledge of lower-level phenomenological
causal regularities regarding electron behaviour.
There are well-known difficulties in spelling out what the entity realist is
actually committed to in terms of our epistemic access to the unobservable
entities that are ‘sprayed’ or manipulated to some empirical effect. Con-
9 French (2014) furthermore takes the continuity and enrichment of the theories’ sym-
metry features to signal the need to shift from (merely) epistemic structural realism (ESR)
to ontological structural realism (OSR):
But if ESR is going to [incorporate the kinds of structures that matter in
QM, such as the structures encoding permutation symmetry], then it will
have to take on the metaphysical consequences of this symmetry and those,
I argue, lead us to abandon the notion of object, hidden or otherwise. In
other words, if structural realism is to broaden its grasp and seize the kinds
of structures that modern physics actually presents to us, then it is going to
have to shift from ESR to OSR. (p.19)
As far as the scientific realism debate in general philosophy of science is concerned, this
shift is in tension with the epistemological motivations that led to the idea of structural
realism in the first place. The degree of epistemic humility that Worrall recommended
by placing the realist’s commitment to mere structure (as opposed to ‘nature’) is quite
drastic from the point of view of ‘standard’ realism. If we take this degree of humility
to be epistemically well motivated in the first place, and if we think that the distinction
between structure and nature can be sensibly drawn, then we should see it as indicating
scientists’ unreliability in theorising about the nature of light and the nature of all other
things (ultimately) quantum mechanical. But this level of scepticism about scientists’
reliability to theorise about the fundamental nature of the world would also, it seems,
speak against the philosopher’s reliability to figure out whether the structural features of
our best theories correspond to a structuralist ontology or otherwise. (See also Saatsi,
2009.)
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sider the entity realist’s commitment to electrons, for instance. The idea is
to capitalise on various kinds of instruments that use electrons effectively as
a tool to some well-controlled effect. Spintronics provides a great example
of modern instrumentation of this kind, relying on scientists’ ability to ma-
nipulate electrons in intricate ways with electric and magnetic fields on the
basis of their electric charge and a quintessentially quantum mechanical fea-
ture of spin. But what does the entity realist’s existential commitment to
spin-12 electrons amount to? An essential part of Hacking’s realist brief is his
advocacy of the causal theory of reference (as developed by Putnam 1975)
to underwrite the truth of the existential claim ‘electrons exist’. With the
causal theory of reference the realist commitment to the referent of ‘electron’
does not presuppose descriptive accuracy of our current theory of electrons
and spin: knowing of the existence of electrons can come apart from knowing
(much) about what electrons are like.
Unsurprisingly, many commentators (e.g. Musgrave 1996) have found
this difficult to stomach: what sense does the entity realist’s existential
claim make in the absence of corresponding commitment to our best theory
of what these entities are actually like? In a broadly similar spirit, Stanford
(2015) has argued that given how very thin the referential-cum-existential
commitment is, antirealists can effectively agree that atoms and electrons
probably exist, since all that really matters for the antirealists is whether or
not we actually have some substantial knowledge of what electrons are like!
I think this line of criticism undermines reference-focused realism com-
mitted to the existence of entities called ‘electrons’. However, as will become
clear shortly, I prefer to think of realist commitment (at least in relation to
fundamental physics, such as QM and spacetime theories) in a way that does
not boil down to claims regarding existence. Entity realism is furthermore
problematic, since it is not clear how the entity realist recipe accounts for the
empirical success of QM at large. This difficulty is accentuated in the context
of the metaphysics of QM. Faced with the radical divergence in the charac-
terisation of spin, charge, and mass in Bohmian versus Everettian variants
of QM, for example, the entity realist is all the more pressed to spell out the
content of her commitment to electrons. For the Bohmian it is not the case
that in spintronics electrons are manipulated on the basis of their intrinsic
property spin, for instance. Rather, Bohmians can regard spin entirely as a
feature of the quantum wavefunction (or whatever |Ψ〉 represents)—it is not
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a property instantiated by the particles, which only have positions (Brown
et al. 1996, Norsen 2014). So, according to this variant of QM the ‘entities’
being manipulated in spintronics, for example, are not electrons, but |Ψ〉.
By contrast, the Everettian regards spin as a property of the entities which
instantiate it. In this way the metaphysical underdetermination leads to
radical uncertainty as to what exactly is causally ‘sprayed’ or manipulated,
and this effectively deflates the entity realist’s epistemic commitment and
her account of the empirical success of QM.
This is a challenge also for a more sophisticated, latter-day entity real-
ism known as semirealism, which shifts the focus from entities to the core
causal properties in an effort to say something more substantial about the
objects of realist commitment. Semirealism, as developed by Chakravartty
(1998, 2007) and Egg (2012, 2015) in particular, is committed to knowledge
of “causal properties that one has managed to detect” (Chakravartty 2007:
47). Semirealists contrast such ‘detection’ properties with ‘auxiliary’ prop-
erties, which are “any other putative properties attributed to particulars by
theories” (ibid.), regarding which we are meant to be agnostic.
Detection properties are connected via causal processes to our
instruments and other means of detection. One generally de-
scribes these processes in terms of mathematical equations that
are or can be interpreted as describing the relations of proper-
ties. [One] can thus identify detection properties as those that
are required to give a minimal interpretation of these sorts of
equations. (ibid., p. 48, my emphasis.)
But what kind of ‘minimal interpretation’ in terms of causal detection
properties can we give, for example, of the equations that predict the be-
haviour of a Stern-Gerlach detector, or quantum cyclotron, or a solid-state
physics device in spintronics? On the face of it, it looks like our handle
on spin risks being merely formal and mathematical if we just limit our
analysis to the ‘minimal’ level of mathematical equations shared by the dif-
ferent variants and metaphysical interpretations of QM (cf. also Morrison
2007). Viewing spin as a ‘detection property’ of the entities involved already
presupposes a layer of metaphysics unsupported by the empirical success at
stake, and it is not even clear how well the causal ideology of semirealism fits
the understanding of spin in e.g. Bohmian mechanics (Brown et al. 1996).
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One begins to worry that in order for the semirealist’s epistemic commit-
ments to be consistent with the varied landscape of quantum metaphysics,
these commitments have to be so minimal that they do little to account for
the empirical success of quantum physics.10
* * *
The prominent realist ‘recipes’ reviewed in this section have been de-
veloped largely independently of the specifics of quantum theory and the
metaphysical issues that challenge realism about QM in particular.11 I will
next argue that instead of any of these popular recipes we should approach
the epistemic demarcation problem by asking how to best account for the
empirical success of QM given (i) its explanatory modal content (shared by
the different variants of QM), and (ii) the emerging interpretation-independent
understanding of the relationship between QM and classical physics.
4 Accounting for the empirical success of QM
Many have thought the underdetermination problem challenges realism about
QM, because the realist needs to pick a specific (realist) interpretation of
QM in order to express her epistemic commitments regarding the relation-
ship between QM and reality, but she has no empirical grounds for doing
so.12 The challenge can appear rather pressing, for how could one claim to
hold a realist attitude towards a theory without being able to say what the
world is like according to it? Antirealism beckons, unless one can respond to
the epistemic demarcation problem in a way that does not require choosing
any specific interpretation.
I think this way of presenting the realist predicament is much too stark.
I will now argue that the realist can hope to provide a satisfactory response
to the epistemic demarcation problem while maintaining a kind of quietism
about the interpretational issue. The resulting position is somewhat minimal
10Saatsi (2012) notes similar worries about semi-realist’s ability to provide a substantial
account of the empirical successes of ether theories.
11Ontic structural realism is a clear exception to this, but for the reasons given (cf. foot-
note 9) I am concerned with structural realism merely as a form a epistemic humility.
12Musgrave (1992) argues that a realist can appeal to general metaphysical criteria to
eliminate all but one competing interpretation. In the light of the anti-metaphysical trend
in the contemporary realism debate such general metaphysical criteria for theory-choice
are difficult to motivate as a reliable source of justification, however.
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in its epistemic commitments, yet sufficiently realist in its spirit. Also,
it is no more minimal than the epistemic commitments that would have
been appropriate for the Newtonians or the ether theorists, for example,
regarding their empirically successful theories (Saatsi 2015, 2016). The key
is to identify when theorising about quantum phenomena slides so deep
into metaphysics that goes beyond empirically justified realist commitments.
Although it is difficult to draw sharp line here, we can reflect on the general
principles that determine the answer. I view the following, in particular,
as hallmarks of deeply metaphysical aspects of scientific theories: (A) the
inability to give rise to new predictions, and (B) the inability to support
bona fide scientific explanations.
The theoretical framework of QM is hugely successful, of course, in terms
of both its predictive capacity and its explanatory power with respect to
various phenomena, and at minimum the realist is committed to claiming
that these varied empirical successes are due to QM latching onto unob-
servable reality. But the realist can regard the extant attempts to spell
out what |Ψ〉 represents as deeply metaphysical—thus lying outside her epi-
stemic commitments—because they neither generate new testable predictions
nor support explanations that are bona fide scientific. Therefore, as they
stand, the realist can deem the different interpretations of |Ψ〉 as an ex-
ercise in metaphysics or exploratory science that transcends her epistemic
commitments.
The realist’s epistemic commitments are thus determined by what she
thinks accounts for the theory’s undeniable empirical successes. Presumably
the realist is unable to provide a fully fledged account of these successes in
the absence of a complete grasp of the relationship between quantum and
classical physics, which would involve both a complete quantum theoretical
understanding of this inter-theoretic relationship and the role of decoher-
ence therein, as well as the lack of clear empirical evidence for certain inter-
pretational aspects of the quantum-classical correspondence. (A complete
account of the theory’s empirical success would of course involve also the
correct metaphysics of |Ψ〉.) But this does not mean that the realist can-
not say anything about what accounts for QM’s empirical success, since she
can point to: (i) the emerging, interpretation-independent, scientific under-
standing of the relationship between the quantum features of reality and
the classical features; and (ii) those modal features of scientific explanations
17
that are supported by QM independently of the specific interpretations of
|Ψ〉.
Let me now elaborate on this sketch, beginning with (A): the inability
of deep metaphysics to give rise to new predictions. We can begin with
the truism that the work on quantum metaphysics and the measurement
problem by and large does not generate any new predictions. The aim of
this work is rather tomake sense of QM and to spell out what the world could
be like according to this or that empirically adequate variant of the theory.
This is all well and good as a foundational and metaphysical endeavour,
but there is an obvious sense in which interpretational and foundational
work is not responsible for QM’s immense predictive and practical successes
that motivate realism in the first place.13 To the extent that the empirical
successes of quantum physics can be regarded as independent from such
metaphysical-cum-foundational work, the realist is justified in bracketing the
fruits of that labour (as they stand) outside of her epistemic commitments.
There is a long tradition in the realism debate at large, as well as in the
philosophy of QM more specifically, to think otherwise. This has been partly
motivated by shortage of coherent realist interpretations of QM and lack
of understanding of the quantum-classical correspondence, and partly by
presuppositions about what realism about the quantum should amount to. It
has been commonly presupposed that realists should be able to tell us what
the nature of reality (quantum or otherwise) is like; that they should be able
to specify what the key theoretical terms (e.g. |Ψ〉, ‘entanglement’, etc.) refer
to; that they should be able to tell what the world must be like to underwrite
the theory’s approximate truth. However, more recent developments on the
epistemic side of the realism debate have driven realists—myself, at least—
to forgo these kinds of commitments in reaction to the challenges from the
history of science and elsewhere.
In the light of the history of science it is simply indefensible, I think, to
maintain the traditional realist hope that our current best theories reveal us
the nature of reality in this way. One should delineate one’s realist commit-
ments towards current science in a way that is applicable to, for example,
Newtonian gravity in the day of Newton, and to Fresnel’s theory of light in
his day, in advance of the subsequent scientific developments that we can
13This is of course not to say that such work cannot become responsible for such suc-
cesses, but this potential has no bearing on our current epistemic commitments.
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now (with the benefit of hindsight) employ to account for those past theor-
ies’ empirical successes from our current vantage point. (See Stanford 2006,
2015; Saatsi 2015.) Such historical applicability of the realist perspective is
forced upon us, lest one is to argue for some kind of exceptionalism about
the epistemic standing of current fundamental physics.14 If one is inclined
to jettison the traditional realist ambition in favour of a more minimal real-
ist attitude that is compatible with the historicist anti-realist arguments,
then one can also give up on the idea that realist commitments towards
QM should automatically include a stance towards metaphysical matters
of the sort required to ‘make sense of QM’ and to say what the world is
fundamentally like according to it.
Let’s now move on to consider (B): the second hallmark of deep metaphysics—
its inability to support bona fide scientific explanations. Drawing a distinc-
tion between scientific and metaphysical explanations is a subtle business,
but the core idea here is quite simple: scientific explanations turn on coun-
terfactual information that by scientific lights is regarded as justified by
empirical evidence. By contrast, the different interpretations of QM furnish
metaphysical explanations in terms of the nature of |Ψ〉 and its relationship
to observable matters, such that the explanatory information in question
does not boil down to counterfactual information that is empirically justified
by the lights of science. Drawing the distinction in these terms is motivated
by recent accounts of scientific explanation, which explicitly capitalise on
counterfactual information of this sort: arguably many scientific explana-
tions, causal and non-causal alike, involve counterfactual information that
links the values of an explanans variable to the state of the explanandum
so as to answer change-relating what-if-things-had-been-different questions
(e.g. Woodward 2003, French and Saatsi forthcoming, Jansson and Saatsi
forthcoming). Arguably the different metaphysical accounts of |Ψ〉 do not
provide further explanatory information of this sort, since they do not in-
volve further explanans variables, such that some empirical explanandum
could be regarded as depending on those variables in an empirically well-
grounded way.15
14The ideas behind (epistemic) structural realism have been an important step in this
direction, but as already indicated in Section 3, I don’t think it’s the best way of spelling
out realist commitments in general.
15Neither are they based on mathematical or logical necessities of the sort that according
to Lange (2013) can support explanations of empirical phenomena without explanatory
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Metaphysical explanations supported by interpretations of QM can be
distinguished from scientific explanations in epistemological terms, even if
they have the same basic structure as scientific explanations. For example,
Schaffer (forthcoming) argues that metaphysical and scientific explanations
share the same tripartite structure of ‘source’, ‘principle’, and ‘result’, where
the connecting explanatory principle can be e.g. causation (in science) and
grounding (in metaphysics), and the explanatory connection can be rep-
resented by structural equation models that capture how variation in the
source is explanatorily connected to variation in the result.16 Applying this
unifying analysis to QM, Schaffer argues that it allows us to make sense
of the wavefunction realists’ metaphysical explanation of how objects and
facts about 3-space are grounded in the fundamental wavefunction. (This is
Schaffer’s response to the worry that Maudlin (2010) amongst others have
voiced about the impossibility of comprehending how the fundamental wave-
function ontology can give rise to regularities in 3-space.) My present point
is that even if we can make sense of the nature of the quantum metaphys-
ical explanation in these broadly modal terms, the explanation need not be
regarded as involving the kind of explanatory connection for which we have
good empirical evidence, and hence the realist should still deem it deeply
metaphysical.
Which explanatory successes of QM should the realist aim to account
for? I think the answer to this question is determined by scientists’ own as-
sessment of the various explanations that QM furnishes: the realist can take
the scientific community as a (hopefully) reliable judge as to which quantum
mechanical explanations should be regarded as undeniable successes. Healey
(2015: 2) rightly observes that “the continuing failure to agree on any spe-
cific realist interpretation or reformulation [of QM] contrasts strikingly with
the widespread acceptance in the scientific community of the enormous ex-
planatory power of contemporary quantum theory”. Healey then goes on to
counterfactuals.
16As Schaffer (forthcoming, p. 2) explains:
With causal explanation, there is the structure of cause (such as the rock
striking the window), law (laws of nature), and effect (such as the shattering
of the window). Metaphysical explanation has a parallel structure, involving
ground (the more fundamental source), principle (metaphysical principles of
grounding), and grounded (the less fundamental result). One finds a similar
structure with logical explanation, involving premise, inference rule, and
conclusion.
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discuss in detail accepted quantum theoretic explanations of single-particle
interference phenomena, the stability of matter, and interference of Bose-
Einstein condensates. It is natural for the realist to rely on scientists’ own
assessment of these kinds of explanatory successes, since in the present dia-
lectic it is the explanatory success of science (as opposed to metaphysics of
science) that the realist aims to account for, and realists typically further-
more argue that scientists’ own assessments of explanations are a reliable
guide to theoretical progress.
It is notable that in providing quantum theoretic explanations of various
phenomena scientists by and large do not feel the need to appeal to any par-
ticular explication of the nature of the quantum state. Also, more specific
explanations of e.g. interference phenomena that indispensably turn on spe-
cific interpretational choices can be ruled out: they do not enjoy sufficiently
wide-spread scientific agreement, since there is no solid empirical evidence
for preferring one such explanation over the alternatives. I furthermore
conjecture that the explanations that physicists largely agree upon are asso-
ciated with reasonably precise and empirically well-founded counterfactual
information, amenable to a counterfactual account of explanation and ex-
planatory understanding (cf. Healey 2015). The realist can thus account for
these explanatory successes in terms of QM getting the appropriate explan-
atory counterfactuals right, since this is what really matters for providing
the explanatory information, and this can be achieved even when the theory
we are operating with is only in some sense a limited ‘approximation’ to a
better theory we don’t yet have (and may never have). Whatever the theory
says about the world beyond those counterfactuals is supererogatory with
respect to accounting for its explanatory success. In a similar way a min-
imal realist can capture the explanatory successes of Newtonian mechanics
and gravity, for example. From a perspective that takes GTR seriously,
the posit of gravitational force, acting at a distance, or Newtonian absolute
simultaneity, are not involved in accounting for the explanatory successes of
Newtonian gravity. By the same token, these genuine explanatory successes
are not undermined by the fact that there are various features of the world
that the theory simply got wrong (Woodward 2003b, Bokulich 2016). It is in
this same spirit that the realist can regard the metaphysical accounts of the
quantum state as simply supererogatory in accounting for the explanatory
successes of QM.
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To summarise, the appropriate realist response to the underdetermina-
tion challenge is to insist that the underdetermination takes place at the level
of deep metaphysics going beyond realist commitments. The different vari-
ants of QM, in as far as they are empirically adequate, all latch onto reality
in ways that account for their empirical success. Getting a more complete
handle on this account is something that will gradually take place alongside
future scientific advancements, and the right realist attitude towards QM
is a matter of confidence and optimism in there being such an account to
be worked out. The underdetermination problem is thus neutralised by a
natural, substantial reduction in realist commitments, which is furthermore
incentivised (for reasons given in Section 2) independently of the underde-
termination challenge: even without the predicament of underdetermina-
tion the issue of separating the empirical wheat from the metaphysical chaff
looms large (cf. Saatsi 2016).17
5 Is this realism at all?
One may feel that the epistemological stance sketched above is insufficiently
realist. At least a couple of potential objections immediately crop up. First,
what can we be realists about, if we bracket the different interpretations of
|Ψ〉 as ‘deep metaphysics’ that transcend realist commitments? Secondly,
what about the notorious measurement problem: how do we respond to
it if we cannot help ourselves to the resources afforded by a fully fledged
interpretation? Isn’t solving the measurement problem a sine qua non for
realism about QM?
Let’s address the latter question first. There is, of course, a long standing
tradition to think that a realist must give an account of what the quantum
state represents in the world in order to deal with the measurement problem.
This line of thought goes as follows. The standard (‘textbook’) QM, which
incorporates the collapse postulate, is not amenable to a realist attitude
17For the sake of the argument and to illustrate, consider a possible counterfactual
history where theorists only ever come up with the de Broglie-Bohm variant of QM and
are unable to conceive of any serious alternatives to it. In the light of the anti-realist
challenges from the history of science, the realist would face the epistemic demarcation
problem even in the absence of any actual alternative underdetermined by the empirical
evidence. In particular, the realist should not want to commit herself to an interpretation
of |Ψ〉 as a peculiar law of nature, say, even if the de Broglie-Bohm variant of QM seemed
like the only game in town.
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towards the dynamics of the theory, given the irreducible role played by
the notion of measurement as yielding determinate observable measurement
outcomes. The upshot, then, is that the orthodox QM, unvarnished with
a ‘realist interpretation’, is best regarded as a mere instrument or recipe
for making predictions. Avoiding such blatant anti-realism about QM—
as the realist desires—thus requires articulating and defending a variant of
QM that does not involve the problematic collapse postulate inconsistent
with the unitary quantum dynamics. That is, it requires articulating and
defending a variant of QM amenable to a realist interpretation.
This standard story is too black-and-white, however, from the perspect-
ive of the kinds of fairly minimal and unambitious epistemological stances
that many (e.g. structural) realists have adopted towards physics in general.
Doing without the collapse postulate and defending a particular realist in-
terpretation of QM are not one and the same thing. There are degrees of
epistemological commitment that fall between adhering to the ‘orthodox’
QM with the collapse postulate, on the one hand, and committing to one or
another variant/interpretation that does without it, on the other. Since the
collapse postulate drops out of the picture in all (current) variants of QM
seriously entertained by the realists, and since it arguably plays less of a role
in the physicists’ actual (more interpretation-independent) use of QM than
the above line of thought suggests, it is natural to consider what can be said
of the relationship between classical and quantum physics independently of
any ‘realist interpretation’.18
It is particularly noteworthy that the unitary quantum dynamics by it-
self gives rise to environment-induced decoherence that is at the heart of
many physicists’ own understanding of the relationship between quantum
and classical physics, in a way that is independent of any particular variant
of QM (Schlosshauer 2007, Wallace 2012). Decoherence does not ‘solve’ the
measurement problem in and of itself, of course, because it does not an-
swer the metaphysical question of what |Ψ〉 represents. An answer to the
metaphysical question is a ‘necessary coda’ (as Rosaler 2016 puts it) to any
decoherence-based account of how (approximately) classical dynamical and
kinematical structures are compatible with a fundamentally quantum real-
18Wallace (forthcoming) convincingly argues against philosophers’ commonplace idea
that collapse (or ‘projection’) postulate is central to “orthodox” or “standard” QM that
physicists employ in practical applications.
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ity. But, as Rosaler (2016) forcefully argues, one can say a good deal about
classical-quantum correspondence even without the interpretational coda.
More specifically, Rosaler argues for the potential for combining technical,
foundational understanding of (i) decoherence, (ii) Ehrenfest’s Theorem for
open quantum systems, and (iii) a decoherence-compatible mechanism for
collapse, in providing a local interpretation-neutral reduction between par-
ticular models of quantum and classical theories. Such a foundational pro-
gramme points to the kind of interpretation-independent account of the
empirical success of quantum mechanics that a realist like myself is com-
mitted to being there to be fully worked out as a part of future science.
Although metaphysical issues concerning effective ‘wave function collapse’
and the ontology underpinning a scientifically kosher reductionist account
is a necessary part of a fully fledged account of quantum-classical corres-
pondence, Rosaler shows how these concerns can be effectively decoupled
from “the bulk of technical analysis necessary to recover localised, approx-
imately Newtonian trajectories from quantum theory” (p. 54). Correspond-
ingly, in defending a realist attitude towards QM one does not need to solve
the measurement problem—to provide the interpretational coda—since the
interpretation-neutral part of the analysis is enough to support the realist
belief that the theory’s empirical success are due to, and can be accounted
for, in terms of it latching onto the unobservable reality in appropriate ways.
As Rosaler (2016: 59) puts it:
[O]ne can go quite far in providing a quantum-mechanical ac-
count of classical behavior without taking on the speculative
commitments associated with some particular interpretation of
quantum theory. Of course, we must also keep in mind that
at most one of these interpretation-specific accounts can be cor-
rect as a description of the collapse mechanism that nature itself
employs.
What does it take to account for a theory’s empirical success exactly?
This is an important question that requires further analysis. I will limit
myself here to noting a couple of complicating issues. For one, the realist’s
optimism about a theory should be compatible with the possibility that we
can more fully account for its empirical success only with the benefit of hind-
sight furnished by a currently unavailable successor theory that advances on
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our present science. (Else, the history of science contains powerful cases
against realism.) But even in the absence of such future science the real-
ist can commit to optimism about there existing such an account, and one
that we can hopefully give in due course. That is, the realist can express
confidence in the fact the theory relates to reality in objective ways that
are responsible to its success. This kind of attitude towards QM is clearly
different from instrumentalism or empiricism; hence I associate it with the
realist tradition. Secondly, there is a difference between a realist account
of empirical success, which can be given in scientifically kosher terms that
do not transcend the reach of available empirical evidence, and a complete
account of empirical success, which can only be given from a (scientific-
ally chimerical) omniscient point of view, involving also deep metaphysics
of reality.
One may be inclined to associate more lofty ambitions with ‘scientific
realism’, of course. For example, one may think that a scientific realist
attitude towards a theory must entail knowledge claims about what kinds
of things are real; what there is; what our theoretical terms refer to (see
e.g. Stanford 2015). Admittedly, by those lights the optimistic epistemic
stance I have sketched does not qualify as realism, given that this stance
indeed does not defend realism about the quantum wavefunction, or spin,
or quantum particles, in anything like the way that standard ‘convergent
realism’ does regarding a theory’s central posits (cf. Laudan 1981). If one is
strongly inclined to stipulate that ‘scientific realism’ must entail such com-
mitment, a new label is needed for the kind of optimism that I have argued
for. (‘Theory-progressivism’ perhaps?) As I see it, this optimism should
be directed towards a more abstract sense in which we are justified in re-
garding QM as latching onto unobservable reality in ways that drive the
theory’s empirical success, both predictive and explanatory. This latching is
a matter of the theory’s central kinematic and dynamical aspects represent-
ing the world’s kinematical and dynamical structures sufficiently faithfully,
in appropriate respects, along the lines studied, e.g., by Rosaler (2016) and
Landsman (2007), and getting right the appropriate modal features of the
world that underwrite undeniable scientific explanations of quantum phe-
nomena.
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